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Abstract
The paper explores a view of research on creativity in design not based on traditional cognitive
science models. Research from the creative cognition standpoint is reviewed with an example
and the problem of applying it to the design case is explained. Creative techniques used in
design lack a scientific base and lack an evaluation of their effectiveness. They emphasise the
generation of ideas and not the generation of tangible solutions. The argument states that
design research should be looking neither to the act of idea generation nor to the act of form
generation and reinterpretation but to the enacted use environment in which designers operate
and from which functions emerge. Departing from new models in cognitive science two
hypotheses are formed. The first claims that the creative outcome in design may be based on
an enacted experience of use and not on a rationalisation of imagery or represented forms.
The second claims that diagrams created during the design process, mainly in its first stages,
may serve the purpose of problem finding and not of problem solving.
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The second part is a characterisation of
creativity enhancement techniques largely
adopted by the design community. In the third
part, based on research about the design
process, some accepted justifications for the
use of external representations in design are
presented. This establishes a ground on which
to build, throughout the paper, an argument
of the inadequacy of current commonly
accepted creativity theories and methods with
regard to the design practice.
The conclusion presents possible research
hypotheses to the problem of creativity in
design as a way of showing future research
paths that may develop more useful integrated
approaches for the design profession.
2. Creativity in the mind
Creativity is generally accepted in cognitive
psychology as the capacity to perform mental
work that leads to an outcome both novel and
applicable. This definition is extensively used
throughout the literature that is directly
related with the subject (Mayer 1999). The
novelty dimension was present since the
beginning, when creativity was still seen as a
mystical phenomenon; it remains the key
concept to explain it. Mednick (1962) is the
1. Introduction
It is not the objective of this paper to invalidate
any definition of creativity, but only to
investigate it within the design case,
identifying the general lack of emphasis given
to the role of concrete representations that
are used while creating. In fact, in most
cognitive psychology research about creativity,
the moment of divergent thinking seems to
be achieved only by using mental concepts or
imagery and never external perceivable
images. On the other hand, in the research
on design thinking, many of the conclusions
from design protocols are misleading because
they attempt to follow the traditional models
of cognitive psychology, which often fail to
attend to the particular nature of design
(Winograd and Flores 1986; Lakoff and
Johnson 1999). As a result, design research
finds itself dealing with contradictions1  that
may have to do with fundamental
misconceptions regarding cognition.
The first part of the paper presents the main
points in psychological research on creativity
as well as the consequent models produced.
1
 Namely the one that contradicts the generally accepted view that form follows
function. Purcell and Gero (1998) claim that function follows form based both on
cognitive psychology experiments and design protocols.
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first to distinguish creative thinking from
original thinking in the way that the former
had to produce useful outcomes while the
latter only had to produce novelties.
Research on creativity is usually done with
regard to a mental process, a personal
characteristic or an outcome episode (Mayer
1999). It is seen as a capacity that can be
important to achieving a better or worse
condition in human daily activities. In this
sense, creativity is studied in the same way
intelligence is and, like intelligence, those who
are more creative are seen as better mentally
equipped to cope with the everyday problems
presented by the environment. So, cognitive
psychology is interested in understanding the
creative individual as a mental entity that can
be assessed through concepts or imagery
manipulated in the mind.
Moreover, most of the research in cognitive
psychology is done by building experiments
where the subjects are asked to deal with
words and abstract concepts and the outcome
is usually a fusion of concepts that has no real
representation.
In some experiments visual elements are used.
However, the level of abstraction remains too
high to be considered in design. In a typical
experiment (Finke, 1996), the subjects were
asked to combine a limited number of shapes
to come up with innovative solutions in a
specific domain of objects (e.g. furniture). No
context was set and no needs identified. The
outcomes were then evaluated by a jury
through the presentation of the formal
arrangement accompanied by a verbal
explanation. The evaluation had two
parameters; originality and practicality and the
outcomes "were classified as creative
inventions" (Finke, 1996:383).
This experiment was established on the basis
of the model of generation and exploration
(Geneplore model) (Finke et al. 1992). In this
model, the creative mind generates
preinventive forms that are subsequently
explored. Here, the act of achieving novelty is
in the generation phase while the act that gives
applicability is in the exploration phase. In this
frame, subjects are asked to generate forms
and later give them meaning as a way of
exploring applicability. The independence of
the moments of generated divergence and
verbalised convergence is what is considered
to bring creative outcomes.
There are problems in applying this model and
these findings to research in design. First, this
experimental construction has little to do with
a design situation in which the subject is faced
with a wicked problem (see, for example,
Buchanan2  1992) where an infinite number
of shapes can be produced. Furthermore, in
design it is the moment of facing the problem
from a particular perspective that lends
originality to the outcome. The solution is not
generated in a vacuum but in a constrained
reality; with what is possible given the
constraints of a particular moment.
Second, the establishment of a domain of
allowed outcomes brings some reality to the
task but does not provide a plausible goal in
which to design (Smith and Browne 1993).
The domain furniture helps the subject focus
on a possible set of outcomes, but does not
give any clue about the constraints one is likely
to face in a real design situation. So, the
problem of representation remains abstract;
it is one of combining the shapes supplied by
the researcher within an archetypal meaning
(furniture) and not one of fulfilling, for
example, the need for seating.
Third, after one form combination is achieved
the subject builds the meaning around it to
justify why it fits the domain attempted. It is
not to create the right artefact from felt need;
it is just constructing meaning through the
combination of forms. It is accidental and
ungrounded form building where everything
may be imagined afterwards, the solution, the
constraints, the use, the manufacturing
process but nothing is tested in a real situation
and the usefulness remains unproven.
Through this model, creativity may be seen
as a good way to identify different ideas but
not to create innovative solutions that can be
implemented. Solution in design is gradually
2The first author to think about the wicked nature of design problems was Horst W. J.
Rittel, cited by Buchanan in this paper.
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built around the experience of making and
using and not around a pure formal concept
standing on its own. This type of experiment
might help to develop an understanding of
cognitive structures relating to the conceptual
creative process, but because they are
established with a totally artificial set of
assumptions, they presuppose a different kind
of creative task, not the one of design.
The design problem is, in every aspect,
different from this one. The designer is faced
with a problem based on real constraints that
he/she ought to identify during the process,
usually starting with ill-defined goals but real
needs to fulfil (Smith and Browne 1993). The
designer takes on the problem as a situation
of use and puts him/herself in the situation of
the needed user, enacting (Purcell and Gero
1998) the use and the manufacture with the
help of sketches and representations to
apprehend the wholeness of the experience.
The representation may be produced to
enhance a whole mind-simulated experience,
to join imagery together in the mind.
However, here, we do not see imagery only
as a precursor of its two-dimensional
representation, but also as an internal
multidimensional and multisensory result of
that same representation. In this sense we can
say that representations in design may have a
role, not only as a working memory aid (Simon
1981), but also as experience understanding,
and synthesis.
It is difficult to accept that what primarily
emerges in creative design outcomes are
forms, and that, from those, function follows
as its interpretation (or reinterpretation)
(Purcell and Gero 1998). In fact, it makes more
sense to think about the act of sketching as
an externalisation that resonates with the
internal formation of imagery in order to help
construct and interpret experiences of use. In
this sense we can never say that function
follows form since it is the inner built
experience of use that remains central in the
design process, being both form producer and
consumer. We urgently need empirical data
to support this claim.
3. Creativity at practice
Most popular approaches to creativity are
concerned with the possibility of turning
individuals into more creative professionals in
their daily work. Some of the authors who
popularised creativity are De Bono (1971,
1985, and 1992) with his practice of lateral
thinking, Osborn (1953) with brainstorming,
and Gordon (1953) with synectics among
others (Adams 1986, Von Oech 1983, Shaw
1991). Common to all of them is the use of
mental strategies to either actively encourage
divergence or at least discourage inhibition.
A reason for the easy acceptance of these
techniques by designers might have to do with
the fact that professionals are, in general, more
open to pragmatic approaches to increasing
performance and not very concerned whether
these techniques have any fundamental
scientific basis for their construction. To a
designer, the promise of a novel outcome is
sufficient to justify its use, but no later
assessment of the results is attempted. Jones
(1974: 54) points out the absence of evaluation
of use of creative methods in design.
Nagasundaram and Bostrom (1994: 51)
consider that some groups may naturally
outperform these techniques when using the
right communication tools. The lack of further
evaluation of creative methods in design
practice is an evident fault.
However, a bigger mistake precedes this. The
scientific psychological basis for these
methods is yet to be found and, even if they
were established in an academic context, they
usually try to look like applied theory without
previous scientific understanding of the
cognitive phenomenon of creativity
(Sternberg and Lubart 1999).
Besides the absence of scientific validity, one
aspect in the indiscriminate use of these
methods in design is revealing. Most of them
were conceived based on a purely mental
process, a play with words and concepts
previous to the evolution of physical
representations. Such "idea generation"
techniques might be useful to certain activities
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where the deliverable is a report, but in design
the creative process does not end with a
concept; the designer is searching for a
concrete form, for a representation of a future
reality. That design creation does not end in a
concept is an unarguable truth because it
obviously ends with a tangible representation
of an artefact as close as possible to the final
artefact itself.
4. Creativity in design
Most of the research done on aspects of
creativity in design is related to the use of
representations during the design process. It
is now well accepted that representations
follow a path of progressive elaboration
through the design process from an
ambiguous, unstructured and abstract nature
towards a structured and more concrete
represented reality. It is also accepted that the
early less concrete and denser
representations, such as sketches, are related
to the more creative phases of the process.
This is explained through a symbol system, fast
reinterpretation of meanings and emergence
of new and unexpected forms (Goel 1995).
However, the reason for the insubstantiality
of the sketch may not be found in what this
ambiguity serves but in what causes it; it may
be a result of the subjective, multidimensional,
multisensory and ill-defined nature of the
design problem. The designer might work
more in a perceptual sphere and less in a
conceptual one because his/her aim is a
perceivable, felt, manageable artefact.
But, related to this, other issues regarding the
nature of reinterpretation and the nature of
what emerges in design creation are yet to be
found. It may be that the moments of
verbalisation both asked by many design
protocols and in the previously described
experimental procedure (Finke 1996), are only
the result of a subsequent rationalisation of
what is being sketched to reinforce its
acceptance (or rejection). It may be just a
result of the culturally created need to
rationalise everything that is created, while the
true act of creation previously happened
during the moments of direct simulated
experience in the dialogue between mental
imagery and sketch.
We are starting to accept the emergence of
forms from enacted reality (Purcell and Gero
1998) previously created in imagery. But the
need to search for a better explanation of the
role of meaning in design creation remains.
There is conceptual meaning and perceptual
meaning in the same way as we accept
conceptual knowledge and perceptual
knowledge (Purcell and Gero 1998).
Conceptual meaning is a metaphorical
construction based on experience while
perceptual meaning is a direct reproduction
of the experience in the mind. With the first
we can deduct, generalise and build coded
knowledge, with the second we can directly
feel if something works or not (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999). Artefacts may exist without
conceptual meaning but it is impossible to
create them without any perceptual meaning.
Furthermore, this notion of perceptual
meaning helps to establish the design process
as heuristic with the notion of reflection in
practice (Schön 1983) because it is a thinking
feature that allows speed and practicality in
action. However, both conceptual and
perceptual meaning seem to have a utility in
the creative act of design, but their specific
roles have yet to be defined.
5. Conclusion
First, Damásio (1994) establishes the role of
emotions in the process of decision making
as our neurochemical link to the environment,
so we know that the link exists and that we
need it to live. He says that we may have all
our reasoning and sensorial processes fully
working, but if we fail to emotionally react,
that is to say in the design case, to put
ourselves in the "skin" of the user, we will not
be able to make decisions. In this sense, the
creative act in design might just be an
immersion into the situation of use, a truly
felt empathy, not because we voluntarily
acknowledge the user but because we need
that connection in order to create. Second,
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) reframe the notion
of reasoning in western philosophy
characterising it as knowing through
metaphor which invariably transmits the
bodily nature of our thought processes.
With this theoretical support, we can build a
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different research path in design, not only to
reframe the nature of the activity but also to
understand what really emerges when
designing. Is creativity in designing just a
matter of emergence of new inspirational
forms from which we verbalise new concepts?
Or is it, rather, a matter of taking on the
problem from a new perspective, which grants
novelty to the outcome and, at the same time,
through the use of simulation skills and tools,
opens designers to the groundedness of the
experience, which identifies its applicability?
We can pose as a first hypothesis that the act
of creation in design happens entirely at an
experiential level, imagined or represented,
and that the following rationalisation mainly
serves as corroboration and social support.
Another hypothesis is that the first steps in
the design process, as they produce more
abstract and diagrammatic representations,
are metaphorical by nature because of the
extreme indefiniteness of the problem and the
consequent incompleteness of the
experience. In this sense, the search for
conceptual meaning is not connected to
solution finding but to problem finding and,
by being so, the originality may reside in the
way we find problems and not in the way we
generate solutions.
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